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Legislation Requiring Child To Support Mother 
in State Asylum Is a Denial of Equal 
Protection-Department of Mental 
Hygiene v. Kirchner 
[Vol. 63 
The California Department of Mental Hygiene brought suit 
under section 6650 of the state's Welfare and Institutions Code,1 a 
provision commonly known as a relative support statute, against the 
administratrix to recover 7,500 dollars from the intestate's estate. 
This amount represented the cost of food, housing, and treatment 
1. Section 6650 reads in pertinent part: 
"The husband, wife, father, mother or children of a mentally ill person or 
inebriate •.• and the estate of such mentally ill person or inebriate, shall be 
liable for his care, support, and maintenance in a state institution of which he is 
~n i:11.mate. T~e liability of such persons and estates shall be a joint and several 
hab1hty •... 
Two other provisions are relevant for a full understanding of the case. Section 6651 
authorizes the Director of Mental Hygiene to reduce, cancel, or remit the amount due 
from the patient or his relatives on satisfactory proof that they are unable to pay all 
or part. Section 6655 directs that the inmate's estate be left intact if there is a 
probability that he may later be released and would become a burden to the com-
munity if his assets were used to pay for his current treatment. Neither of these appears 
to have played a direct part in this decision, although the court felt it was inconsistent 
to protect the inmate's assets under § 6655 while possibly depleting those of his 
relatives. 
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received by intestate's mother in a state mental hospital during the 
four years she had been confined there following a civil sanity hear-
ing. Plaintiff was granted judgment on the pleadings. On appeal to 
the California Supreme Court, held, reversed. Since mental hospitals 
serve a proper public function, it is a denial of equal protection of 
the law within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment to burden 
arbitrarily one class of society, e.g., an incompetent's children, with 
a patient's expenses.2 Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 
60 Cal. 2d 716, 388 P.2d 720, cert. granted, 85 Sup. Ct. 39 (1964). 
Despite its incorporation into other legal systems as far back as 
Hammurabi,3 the natural law precept that men must assist less 
fortunate relatives has not been unequivocally accepted as a part of 
common law. English judges were reluctant to require persons of 
ability even to maintain their wives and minor children much less 
their parents.~ However, some American courts, without the aid of 
legislation, have bound husbands and fathers to provide for spouses 
and offspring (including offspring who have become handicapped 
adults) and have explicitly refused to let this responsibility pass to 
2. To appreciate the significance of the court's holding, additional information is 
necessary. Since intestate's mother had about $5,500 worth of unencumbered assets of 
her own at the time suit was filed, defendant challenged only the Department's right to 
seek the full $7,500 maintenance cost from decedent's estate. (See generally note 1 
supra.) When defendant appealed to the California Supreme Court, he raised two 
issues for hearing: (I) does § 6650 impose unconditional liability upon an adult child 
for the care of an incompetent mother when the mother has funds of her own, and (2) 
if it does impose such liability, does it not then deny due process and equal protection? 
Petition for Hearing, pp. 2-3. Defendant actually admitted the constitutionality of the 
statute apart from its application in a situation where the parent can still support 
himself. Petition for Hearing, p. 9. The court gave little attention to the questions 
raised but proceeded to "the fundamental issue tendered by the case" and invalidated 
the entire concept of requiring a child to support a parent patient. In asking the 
United States Supreme Court to review the decision, the Department contended it was 
denied due process in not being given an opportunity to brief and argue the broader 
question upon which the case was decided. Petition for Certiorari, pp. 19-23. 
Although the opinion makes no reference to the fourteenth amendment of the 
federal constitution, the court speaks of "equal protection" whereas the California 
Constitution uses the phrase "uniform operation" of the law. In addition, the court 
relied upon United States Supreme Court cases to support its conclusion. 
3. The Babylonian king (c. 2000 B.C.) provided that a woman afflicted with disease 
should be kept at the house of her husband and supported by him. CODE OF HAM-
MUJWlI § 148 (Harper ed. 1904). The concept of intra-family assistance for unfortunate 
members is also observed in ancient Hebrew law. Eisenstadt, Early History and 
Principles of Jewish Family Law, 60 JURID. REv. 48 (1948). The Napoleonic and 
Japanese Codes specifically provide that destitute parents be maintained by children. 
CIVIL CODE OF JAPAN art. 955 (Sebald 1934); AMOS & WALTON, INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH 
I.Aw 85-86 (1963). 
4. The judges in Manby v. Scott, 1 Sid. 109, 82 Eng. Rep. 1000 (Ex. 1663), felt that, 
while a wife might starve at the hands of an inconsiderate husband, the Divine precept 
decreeing the mastery of the husband over his spouse was not easily to be circumvented. 
They preferred that the Chancellor or local bishop find a remedy for the unfortunate 
spouse. The refusal of English courts to require support of children and other relatives 
is shown in Mortimore v. Wright, 6 M. & W. 482, 151 Eng. Rep. 502 (Ex. 1840) and 
Rex v. Munden, 1 Str. 190, 93 Eng. Rep. 465 (K.B. 1718). 
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the state merely because these dependents became insane. 5 On the 
whole, however, the duty to support relatives has been statutory in 
Anglo-American jurisdictions, beginning with the Parliamentary 
enactment of 160 I and extending to modem times in various forms, 
including section 6650 and its counterparts in the majority of states.6 
It is uncertain whether the principal case meant to invalidate section 
6650 as it obligates husbands and fathers to maintain incompetent 
wives and children and, thereby, to question the constitutionality 
of established common-law authority.7 Nevertheless, the ruling that 
children are denied equal protection in having to assist their parents 
challenges a deeply rooted custom, if not common-law authority. 
Although the weight to be given past custom in deciding present 
constitutional issues is a much debated point, it is apparent "the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not tear history up by the roots.''8 
The equal protection clause does not prohibit every type of class 
legislation. Rather, it allows broad discretion to promulgate laws 
affecting selected individuals provided there is a reasonable difference 
between them and the rest of the community that is significant in 
light of the purpose the statute is designed to achieve. The rationality 
of a given classification may be tested by reference to everyday ex-
perience.9 Thus, it is permissible to license only male bartenders if 
5. Inhabitants of Brookfield v. Allen, 88 Mass. (6 Allen) 585 (1863); Rowell v. 
Town of Vershire, 62 Vt. 405, 19 Atl. 990 (1890); cf. Wells v. Wells, 227 N.C. 614, 44 
S.E.2d 31 (1947). Contra, Richardson v. Stuesser, 125 Wis. 66, 103 N.W. 261 (1905). 
6. The Poor Relief Act, 1601, 43 Eliz. 1, c. 2, § 7, provided that parents, grand-
parents, and children should support the poor and incapacitated according to their 
ability. 
A large majority of American jurisdictions have passed statutes requiring relatives 
to contribute to the maintenance of family members confined to state mental 
institutions. Most are similar to the provision under consideration in that they obligate 
capable parents, spouses, and adult children to reimburse the government. Texas does 
not require compensation from capable adult children. TEX. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 
3196(a) (1952). Illinois limits the total amount expected from all responsible relatives to 
fifty dollars a month and terminates an individual's obligation after his twelfth year's 
payment. ILL. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 91, §§ 1-15, 12-21 (1963). 
Analogous legislation usually requires relatives to lighten the public burden by 
assisting their relatives in need of medical treatment or regular county welfare grants. 
See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 400.77, 401.2 (1948). 
7. The opinion specifically refers to the issue presented as the right of the legisla-
ture to require one adult to support another adult. Principal case at 718. It also hints 
that a husband, whose "basic obligation [of supporting his wife arose] from the 
marriage contract," may not be able to rely upon the present decision. Id. at 719. 
8. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 465 (1948); see State v. Griffiths, 203 A.2d 
144, 148 (Conn. 1964). Mr. Justice Holmes once wrote: "If a thing has been practiced for 
two hundred years by common consent, it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth 
Amendment to affect it •••• " Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922). Of 
course, too much reliance can be placed on history. However, jurists and authors agree 
that tradition must play some role in deciding contemporary questions. Wofford, 
The Blinding Light: The Uses of History in Constitutional Interpretation, 31 U. CHI, 
L. REv. 502 (1964). 
9. Walters v. City of St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231, 237 (1954); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 
U.S. 535, 540 (1942). 
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the legislature believes women have less ability to keep order in a 
tavern, or to exempt certain amusement centers from the provisions 
of a Sunday closing law if there is reason to feel this will facilitate 
the community's enjoyment of its day of rest.1° Furthermore, each 
statutory classification is presumed constitutional. When it is ques-
tioned, the challenger bears the burden of proving that no reasonable 
state of facts can be conceived to sustain it. The court's function is 
limited to disapproving only those legislative categories that· the 
complainant has shown to be essentially arbitrary or invidious.11 
Section 6650 serves three purposes. In regard to each, relatives 
stand in a position distinct from that of the general public. First, the 
legislation exacts some return from a patient's loved ones for the 
unique satisfaction they experience in seeing him well cared for at 
a state hospital.12 Second, the provision fosters a sense of intra-family 
dependence and togetherness, which is vital to the success of any 
mental health program and which many feel is jeopardized when 
state aid replaces relative assistance.13 The desire to preserve family 
ties is a proper motive for enacting selective legislation.14 Finally, 
section 6650 finances the treatment of indigent incompetents. For 
centuries, courts have recognized that the natural law obliges men 
to supply necessities to certain relatives unable to provide for them-
selves and that the legislature may give statutory sanction to these 
natural law precepts.15 When the court in the principal case suggests 
there is no rational basis under the equal protection clause for choos-
10. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Fitzpatrick v. Liquor Control 
Comm'n, 316 Mich. 83, 25 N.W.2d 118 (1946). 
11. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 463-64 (1957); McGowan v. Maryland, supra note 
10, at 426. It has been suggested that the Court is more sympathetic to an equal 
protection argument asserted against a statute restricting civil rights than against one 
affecting economic liberty. A plaintiff seeking to invalidate legislation of the latter 
type undertakes an unusually difficult task. See McKay, Political Thickets and Crazy 
Quilts: Reapportionment and Equal Protection, 61 MICH. L. REv. 645, 665-69 (1963). 
12. This purpose is similar to that behind the extra tax on public utilities that 
forces them to repay the government for granting monopoly privileges. Compare New 
York Rapid Transit Corp. v. City of New York, 303 U.S. 573, 580 (1938). 
Nebraska has given judicial attention to the question of whether a relative derives a 
benefit from the patient's hospitalization and has concluded that he does. Compare 
Baldwin v. Douglas County, 37 Neb. 283, 55 N.W. 875 (1893), with Kearney County v. 
Elsam, 81 Neb. 490, 116 N.W. 270 (1908) and State v. Heupel, 114 Neb. 797, 210 N.W. 
275 (1926). 
13. Recent controversy over federal medical assistance to the elderly focused atten-
tion on this point. Hearings on the King Bill Before the House Committee on Ways 
and Means, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. passim (1961). The trend in our society away from the 
traditional notion of a close relationship between family members of different genera-
tions is partially responsible for the present increased incidence of mental breakdowns 
among older people. Compare HsIAo-T'UNG FEI, PEASANT LIFE IN CHINA 74-75 (1939), 
with Dunham, Sociological Aspects of Mental Disorders in Later Life, in MENTAL 
DISORDERS IN LATER LIFE 165-68 (Kaplan ed. 1956). 
14. Meredith v. Ray, 292 Ky. 326, 166 S.W.2d 437 (1942). 
15. People v. Hill, 163 Ill. 186, 46 N.E. 796 (1896); Rex v. Munden, I Str. 190, 93 
Eng. Rep. 465 (K.B. 1718) (stating quite confidently that there is no natural law duty 
to support mothers-in-law). 
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ing relatives over the general public to maintain patients, it implies 
that this natural law tenet is one the legislature cannot enforce. 
When it says a classification founded on consanguinity is arbitrary, it 
disregards much judicial precedent as well as statistical evidence in-
dicating that the bulk of Americans believe it only proper for the 
less fortunate to rely upon their relatives rather than the state.16 
The court sought support for its result in Department of Mental 
Hygiene v. Hawley,11 which had held section 6650 unconstitutional 
as applied to a father whose son was hospitalized in a mental institu-
tion by a criminal court to await trial for matricide. However, the 
difference in theory and practice between civil and criminal com-
mitment makes Hawley inapposite to the facts of the instant case. 
A civil patient like intestate's mother need not manifest antisocial 
tendencies to be hospitalized.18 The code provisions relating to the 
two types of confinement underscore the distinction between them. 
While the criminal patient comes to the attention of the court only 
after his arrest in connection with a violation of the law, the civil 
patient is most often referred to the state for treatment in a confiden-
tial manner by a close friend or relative. Whereas the former must be 
committed to a state facility and restricted there until released by a 
court, the latter is encouraged to avoid confinement by seeking help 
on his own. Should hospitalization appear necessary, it may often be 
in a private sanitarium if the incompetent so desires.19 Because so 
much weight was placed on Hawley, it might be thought the justices, 
unmindful of these realities, looked upon civil commitment as a 
mere alternative to imprisonment and felt relatives should not be 
forced to maintain patients because they need not support convicts. 
Yet other portions of the opinion make it apparent the court was not 
ignorant of the dissimilarity; for it emphasized that, unlike prisoners, 
16. State Comm'n in Lunacy v. Eldridge, 7 Cal. App. 298, 94 Pac. 597 (1908). (This 
case was not mentioned by the court in the principal case.) Beach v. District of Colum• 
bia, 320 F.2d 790 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 943 (1963). 
A recent survey indicates two-thirds of American householders feel that, apart from 
Social Security, the duty of relatives to assist one another in times of distress takes 
precedence over the state's responsibility. MoRGAN, DAVID, COHEN 8e BRAZER, INCOME 
AND WELFARE IN THE UNITED STATES 275 (1962). It might be noted that in 1959 an 
estimated seven billion dollars was given as charity to individuals compared with six 
billion dollars to churches and two billion dollars to such causes as the Community 
Chest. In addition, another 4.5 billion dollars is presumed to have been spent on food 
and other necessities for adult relatives living with younger family members. Id. at 
259-60. 
17. 59 Cal. 2d 247, 379 P.2d 22 (1963). 
18. One may be classified as mentally ill and may be hospitalized if he is of such 
mental condition as to require supervision, care, treatment, or restraint or is likely to 
be dangerous to himself or others. CAL. WELFARE 8e INST'Ns CODE §§ 5040, 5100. 
19. Compare CAL. PEN. CODE § 1026, with CAL. WELFARE 8e INST'Ns CODE § 5047, 5100, 
6725-26. See Comment, Commitment of the Mentally Ill-Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County, 36 So. CAL. L. R.:Ev. 109 (1962). 
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civil patients must continue to pay their own expenses if they are able 
to do so.20 
Precisely because a hospital is not a prison, this decision may give 
rise to a number of undesirable consequences. Whereas the law pro-
vides fairly specific guidelines for determining which persons are 
criminals, it often is difficult to distinguish the mentally ill from the 
elderly senile. The court's ruling encourages the inconsiderate child 
to attempt to place a feeble-minded parent in a mental institution to 
be cared for at state expense.21 Unlike prisoners, who are confined 
for a definite minimum term, many mental patients are permitted 
lengthy periods of home leave provided relatives are willing to care 
for them. This therapeutic practice is likely to suffer if relatives no 
longer need bear the cost of support while the patient remains in the 
hospital.22 Undoubtedly, pressure will mount upon hospital super-
intendents to exercise their prerogative of discharging those patients23 
who, although uncured, are not threats to society, often forcing them 
to seek unhappy refuge with relatives who do not welcome their 
release. Furthermore, when the Victorian analogy between asylums 
and penitentiaries cannot be relied upon to isolate the decision of the 
principal case to its own facts, the result may reverberate throughout 
the entire Welfare Code, voiding other sections that impose a duty 
similar to that of section 6650 to support relatives.24 Indeed, if these 
similar provisions are not invalidated, an anomaly would result; 
while the medical bills of an indigent cardiac patient could be re-
quired to be paid by his children,25 the children of an impoverished 
victim of a mental disease could not be required to reimburse the 
20. Principal case at 720. Prisoners may be paid up to thirty-five cents an hour for 
their productive services. This amount is held in trust for them until their release. 
CAL. PEN. CODE § 2700. 
21. The distinction between senility, which is not considered a mental illness, and 
senile brain disease, which is considered a mental illness, is almost imperceptible. 
Compare Rothschild, Senile Psychoses and Psychoses with Cerebral Arteriosclerosis, in 
MENTAL DISORDERS IN LATER LIFE 307 (Kaplan ed. 1956), with 34 OPS. CAL. An'y GEN. 
313 (1959). 
22. Petition for Rehearing, app. F. In July of 1964 there were 32,506 residents in 
California hospitals for the mentally ill. There were 15,745 additional patients away 
on some form of leave. CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF MENTAL HYGIENE, MONTHLY STATISTIGAL 
SUMMARY, table 1 CTuly 1964). 
23. CAL. WELFARE &: INST'NS CODE § 6730. See also CAL. WELFARE &: INST'NS CODE § 
5100. Already, since the principal case was decided, one relative has brought suit to 
enjoin the Department from releasing a patient. Guardianship of Owens, No. 28456, 
San Mateo, Cal., Super. Ct., Aug. 1964. 
24. Suits are now pending in California trial courts attacking statutes requiring 
support for the aged, juveniles in youth homes, mentally disordered not committed to 
institutions, and CAL. WELFARE &: INST'Ns CODE § 2576 which provides for relative assist-
ance in general. Petition for Certiorari, p. 18, n.30. One trial court, relying on the 
principal case, held unconstitutional the parent's liability for support of mentally 
retarded children in state hospitals. In the Matter of Dudley, No. 2160, Alameda 
County, Cal., Super. Ct., April 1964. 
25. CAL. WELFARE &: INST'Ns ConE §§ 2500, 2576. 
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state for his expenses. However, it does not appear that the court 
intends to permit this peculiarity, for in concluding in the principal 
case, Justice Schauer noted that the whole concept of legislation re-
quiring support of relatives is ripe for re-examination in light of the 
"social evolution" of the past fifty years.26 
As disturbing as the social and economic implications of the 
principal case may be,27 its rationale is more so. The underlying 
theme of the entire opinion suggests the legislature overstepped its 
authority in imposing a special burden on a few citizens to support a 
humanitarian mental health service that benefits the whole com-
munity. One cannot escape the uneasy feeling that the Supreme 
Court of California accomplished in one opinion what the Congress 
of the United States has found impossible to achieve through sessions 
of debate on medical care for the aged. Considering its rejection of 
tradition, popular sentiment, and analogous case law precedent con-
struing the equal protection clause, it can only be said that the court 
obscured the distinction between the wisdom of the legislature's 
policy decision to tax on the basis of consanguinity and its power to 
enact a law to carry that determination into effect. It ruled against 
the lawmakers on the latter point because it disagreed with them on 
the former-a judicial undertaking wholly inconsistent with the 
teachings of the Supreme Court on interpretation of the fourteenth 
amendment.28 
26. Principal case at 722. 
27. The Department estimates its annual collections from parents for maintenance 
of adult offspring at $1,080,054; from children for maintenance of parents at $893,272, 
and from spouses for maintenance of their husbands and wives at $1,509,272. In addi-
tion, more than two million dollars is received annually in benefits from insurance 
covering spouses and children. Petition for Rehearing, app. E. New York estimates 
relatives contribute ·some ten million dollars annually to finance its mental health 
program. N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1964, p. 21, col. I (city ed.). 
28. "We have returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do not 
substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who 
are elected to pass laws." Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963). See also note 
11 supra and accompanying text. That the California legislature is exercising its judg-
ment is apparent from the fact its 1961 session discontinued relative assistance for the 
blind and physically disabled. CAL. WELFARE & INsr'NS CODE §§ 3011, 34ll, 4011. 
